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Banishment From
The Kingdom of Lake (County)
Nelson G. Karl*
0N THE 19TH DAY OF MAY, 1971, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied
habeas corpus relief to Michael Edsall, a fourteen year old boy
who had been banished from Lake County, Ohio.'
The facts in this case of Mike Edsall are simple. Mike had been
truant from school for a number of days. Upon his return, the school
authorities dealt with his truancy in traditional fashion by suspend-
ing Mike from school for a specified number of days. During this
period of suspension, Mike was found on school grounds. He was
warned that if he were found on school grounds again during the
suspension period, he would be turned over to the juvenile court.
Mike failed to heed these warnings and the following day was again
found on school grounds. As a result of these transgressions the
school authorities filed a complaint in the Juvenile Court of Lake
County.2 In May, 1970, the Juvenile Court adjudicated Mike a delin-
quent and sentenced him to 30 days in the detention home. By this
time, Mike's parents had moved to an adjoining county and the
Court proceeded to suspend the 30 day sentence and placed Mike on
probation in the custody of his parents, conditioned on Mike remain-
ing outside Lake County unless in the company of his parents. The
probation order and the banishment from Lake County did not con-
tain a termination date. On July 6, 1970, Mike was again found in
Lake County where he was napping on the couch in a private home
owned by friends. Mike was taken into custody for probation viola-
tion and was again before the Juvenile Court on July 9, 1970. The
Court revoked his probation for violation of its terms and conditions,
and Mike was ordered to serve his 30 day sentence in the detention
home.3
In denying habeas corpus relief to Mike Edsall, the Ohio Supreme
Court concluded that the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over both
the person of Mike Edsall and the subject matter, and that an appeal
from the decision would have been the appropriate means by which
the order of the Juvenile Court could be reviewed.4 But in so doing,
the Supreme Court avoided dealing with the substantive issue of
whether "banishment" was a valid order of a court.
*Member of the Ohio Bar; partner in the law firm of Rudd, Karl, Sheerer & Lybarger,
of Cleveland, Ohio.
1 In re Edsall, 26 Ohio St.2d 145, 269 N.E.2d 848 (1971).
2 Ohio v. Edsall, Juvenile Court, Lake County, Ohio Case No. 16-542 (1970).
3 Id.
4 In re EdsaIl, 26 Ohio St.2d 145, 269 N.E.2d 848 (1971).
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Historical Aspects of Banishment Briefly Noted
Although this decision was dispositive of the case of Mike Edsall,
it did not determine whether a court had authority to issue an order
of banishment or exile. Banishment has been defined in Webster's
New 20th Century Dictionary, Second Edition, to mean:
To condemn to leave one's country by authority of the
sovereign or government, either temporarily or for life; to
exile. Syn. exile, expel.
Black's Law Dictionary in quoting from U. S. v. JuToy,5 defines ban-
ishment as:
... punishment inflicted upon criminals by compelling
them to quit a city, place or country, for a specific period of
time, or for life.
The concept of banishment is hardly new. Banishment was em-
ployed extensively in ancient Rome. It was statutory in England for
the Crown to transport prisoners beyond the seas for life for certain
felonies.6 "Banishment" was first known in England as "abjuration,"
where the party accused fled to a sanctuary, confessed his crime, and
took an oath to leave the kingdom and not return without permission.
This was not viewed as a punishment but as a condition of pardon.7
The twelfth section of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,8
one of the three great muniments of English liberty ever enacted,
held that:
The subject of this realm, that now is or hereafter shall
be an inhabitant or resident of this kingdom of England, dom-
inion of Wales, or town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, shall nay
be sent prisoner into Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsye,
Tangier, or into parts, garrisons, islands, or places beyond
the seas . . . and that every such imprisonment is hereby
enacted and adjudged to be illegal.
The section went on to provide:
The person or persons who knowingly frame, contrive,
write, seal, or countersign any warrant for such commitment
or in any way advising, aiding, or assisting therein . . .
shall be disabled thenceforth to bear any office or trust or
profit within said realm of England, dominion of Wales, or
town of Berwick-upon-Tweed . . . and be incapable of any
pardon from the King, his heirs and successors.
Although exile has never been made a part of the statutory or
common law of the United States, nevertheless the concept is hardly
new in this country. It is a matter of common knowledge that count-
less courts in the various states have banished from their territorial
jurisdictions persons considered to be undesirable and a blight on
5 United States v. JuToy, 198 U.S. 253, 269 (1905).
6 Rex v. Lewis, I Moody cc 372 (1832).
7 6 C.J. Banishment § 1178 (1916).
9 The English Statute of 31 Car. 1I. C. 2, (1679) is the original and prominent habeas
corpus act. This act was the forerunner of similar statutes enacted in all the United
States and is regarded as the great constitutional guaranty of personal liberty. c.f.,
H. Cooper, Habeas CorPus in Peru: Myth and Reality, 20 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 603
(1971).
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the landscape, such as drunks, vagrants and other persons who can
generally fit the classification of being a nuisance. In their endeavor
to cleanse their communities, courts have seen fit to order loiterers
and so called disturbers of the peace and alleged hoodlums to "stay
out of town." Perhaps such court orders are throw backs to the law
of the old west portrayed in cinema and on television where the gun-
slinging sheriff apprehends a trouble maker and orders him to "stay
out of Dodge City." However, only a few such cases have found their
way to the appellate courts for review so as to establish a body of
applicable law. This is not too difficult to understand when we con-
sider the mechanism of a court ordered banishment which is ordi-
narily a form of probation as an alternative to serving time in jail.
In most cases, the defendant is only too happy to accept exile as a
substitute for imprisonment. Consequently, few courts have had the
opportunity to examine the legal issues involved, and the substantive
issues offered the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of In re Edsall,9
would have constituted a case of first impression in Ohio.
Early United States Decisions
The first reported United States case wrestling with the question
of exile was United States v. Fong Yue Ting,1° decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 1893.
Ting was an alien resident of the United States fighting deporta-
tion under the Act of 1892 affecting the rights of Chinese laborers
to reside in the United States. A due process argument based on the
14th Amendment was advanced by Mr. Joseph H. Choate, but the
Court held that every sovereign nation has the power to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions. But the Court, even at
that time, clearly distinguished the rights of a citizen from those
of a foreigner. The thrust of the decision was predicated on the fact
that Ting was an alien and thus may be expelled or deported when
the government so chooses. The question of deportations and the
rights of aliens are outside the scope of this article and the Ting
case is reported only insofar as it deals with the concept of exile.
The first reported decision found in the United States involving
a citizen was State v. Baker," decided in 1900 by the Supreme Court
of South Carolina. After a conviction for grand larceny, the sentence
of imprisonment contained the provision: "After you have served
five years, you will be released with the understanding you leave
the state and never set foot in it again." The Supreme Court held
that the sentencing court had no power to impose banishment from
the state upon a defendant convicted of grand larceny. The Court
reached these conclusions, not on constitutional grounds, but by
reasoning that banishment was not a punishment authorized by the
In re EdsaJl, 26 Ohio St.2d 145, 269 N.E.2d 948 (1971).
1 I49 U.S. 698 (1892).
58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501 (1900).
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statutory or common law of the State of South Carolina. In accord
with this holding was the case of Hoggett v. State,12 decided in 1912
in Mississippi where it was held that the suspension of a sentence
on condition that the defendant leave the country was void.
Consideration of the Right of Assemblage
An order of banishment or exile must be considered within the
context of at least three amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. Banishment involves the right of assembly guaranteed by the
First Amendment, 13 the right to be secure in one's person guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment, 14 and due process of law as guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 15
It was held in United Mineworkers of America v. Illinois Bar Asso-
ciation,'8 that laws which actually affect exercises of the right to
assemble: peacefully . . . cannot be sustained merely because they
were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the
state's legislative competence, or even because said laws do in fact
provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil. The Court
further held that the right to assemble peacefully was among the
most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
The fact situations where courts have paid homage to the right
of assemblage range far and wide. A federal district court in Mary-
land upheld the right of a practicing nudist to apply for employment
as a police officer.17 The court held that to do otherwise would be
andnfringement on his rights of association. Another federal district
court held unconstitutional a Georgia statute prohibiting police offi-
cers from forming or belonging to a labor union as a violation. of
First Amendment rights of assembly.' 8 The right of assembly is so
sacrosanct that it includes the inanimate within its ambit. In Hague
v. Committee for Industrial Organizations,19 Justice Stone incorporated
parks and streets into the First Amendment when he wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public,
and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assem-
bly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discuss-
ing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, rights
and liberties of citizens.
The rights of freedom of assemblage has gathered in its wings
political groups of all hues. When a legislative committee in the State
of Florida required the production of the membership records of the
12 101 Miss. 69, 57 S. 811 (1912).
13 U.S. CoNsr. amend I.
14 U.S. Cosr. amend. IV.
15 U.S. CoxsT. amend XIV.
1 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
17 Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 53 (D. Md. 1970).
18 Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Md. 1971).
19 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
May 197/2
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss2/15
BANISHMENT SENTENCES
N.A.A.C.P., the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a finding
of contempt and held that the freedom to engage in associations for
the. advancement of beliefs and ideas in an inseparable aspect of the
liberty assured by freedom of association.2 0 The following year, the
Supreme Court considered a case where a passport was denied to a
member of the Communist party who refused to yield his member-
ship. The Court held that the right to travel is a fundamental personal
liberty and cannot be arbitrarily curtailed.2 1 In another case involving
communists, the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act providing that when a communist-
action organization is under a final order to register, it is unlawful
for any member of the organization to engage in employment in a
defense facility. The Court found that freedom of association pro-
tected by the First Amendment is as basic as the right to travel.2 2 In
Brandenburg v. Ohio,2 3 the Supreme Court considered a case involving
the Ku Klux Klan that was shocking on its facts. The defendant, a
leader of the Klan, addressed a Klan rally where a large wooden
cross was burned and where firearms were carried. His remarks in-
cluded "Bury the niggers," and "Send the Jews back to Israel." He
was convicted under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the basis of freedom of speech and
assembly. The Court held in a per curiam opinion that the right of
peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and
press and equally fundamental.
In Ohio, a municipal court found an ordinance unconstitutional
which prohibited the congregation in or about any place where
prostitution was carried on for the reason that the ordinance violated
one's right of free and peaceful assembly. 24 It was held in Texas that
the right of assembly may be regulated but cannot be denied.2 5 A
Mississippi court held that although a municipality might encounter
considerable difficulty in maintaining peace in the event of man's
disorders, it has no reason to deny, even in part, the citizens of a city
the right to assemble peacefully when public disorder is not threat-
ened.26 The court found it to be the character of rights granted under
this amendment and not that of limitations of government which has
the greatest significance under the Federal Constitution. As stated in
Shelton v. Tucker,2 7 even though the governmental purpose may be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
20 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
21 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 387 U.S. 500 (1964).
22 United States v. Robel, 399 U.S. 529 (1967).
23 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
24 City of Dayton v. Allen, 28 Ohio Misc. 181 (1971).
25 Geissler v. Coussoulis, 424 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
26 Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F.Supp 926 (D. Miss. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1377 (5th
Cir. 1969).
27 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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which broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. In Alves v. Justice Court of Chico
Judicial Distrct,28 the court struck down a curfew ordinance and held:
The general right of every person to enjoy and engage
in lawful and innocent activity while subject to reasonable
restriction cannot be completely taken away under the guise
of police regulation. Any regulation to the contrary will be
stricken down as an arbitrary invasion of the inherent per-
sonal rights and liberties of all citizens ...
The right of peaceful assembly set forth by the First Amendment
has been fully and completely recognized as a cornerstone of our
American system. It is difficult to conceive a more absolute denial
of the right of assembly than banishment; Yet the constitutional
issues have never been dealt with in a reported decision.
Banishment Visited and Revisited
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held in 1953 that the sen-
tence of banishment was impliedly prohibited by public policy and a
sentence of such character was void. 29 Although the Court did not
attempt to base its ruling on constitutional considerations, it did make
reference in its dictum to the fact that throughout the ages, the lot
of the exile has been hard. Justice Parker went on to state, "There
comes ringing down the centuries the words of the Psalmists: 'By
the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we
remembered Zion.' It is not a sound policy to make other states a
dumping ground for our criminals."
The constitutional issues were advanced in Michigan when the
Supreme Court of Michigan considered the case of People v. Baum.30
Baum had been convicted of violating the liquor laws in the State
of Michigan and was ordered to pay a fine and to leave the state
for a period of five years. Baum claimed that his rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. The Court refused
to decide the case on the constitutional issues raised, but further
expanded the rhetoric and reasoning on the question of banishment
when it reversed the sentencing court. The Court in Baum commented
on the practice in England where certain persons were banished to
the colonies. It went on to comment that one state cannot dump its
undesirables upon another. Such an act would incite dissention, pro-
voke retaliation and disturb the fundamental quality of political rights
among the states. The Court further found that there was no author-
ity by statute for such an order and that banishment was prohibited
as a matter of public policy. A similar result was obtained in Mary-
land where the Court of Appeals held that the trial court was without
power to suspend a sentence on condition that the defendant return to
Puerto Rico for a period of 10 years.31
28 148 Cal. App.2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957).
29 State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E.2d 922 (1953).
80 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930).
81 Bird v. Maryland, 231 Md. 432, 190 A.2d 804 (1963).
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An interesting case with a novel twist was decided in Kentucky
in 1965 in Weigand v. Kentucky. 32 In this case, Weigand's probation
was revoked when he violated the banishment provision of his pro-
bation. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the sentencing
court was without power to inflict banishment in the first place.
Therefore, since the terms of probation providing for banishment
were void, the entire probation was invalid and Weigand must serve
a prison term. Thus in effect, the Court of Appeals arrived at the
same destination as the trial court incarcerating Weigand although
the two courts got there by different routes. Where the trial court
imposed prison for violation of probation, the Court of Appeals held
that the probation itself was invalid because it was conditioned on
banishment. One can surmise that Weigand had much time to reflect
on his legal victory while reposing in the Kentucky jails. A con-
trary result was obtained in the State of California where a more
tolerant court merely struck down the illegal condition of banish-
ment but otherwise permitted the probation to continue. 33
As early as 1937, the State of California held that the deporta-
tion of the defendant to Mexico was an invalid order.34 In 1946,
California held that habeas corpus was an appropriate procedure by
which to attack an order of banishment.3 5 The court further held that
the prohibition against banishment from the state also applied with
equal force to banishment from the city or county.36 This California
court further commented that the old Roman custom of ostracizing
a citizen has never been adopted in the United States.
Another case of interest also arose in California where the prose-
cutor argued that the sentencing court was following a time honored
and well established custom in the state, but the appellate court
considered the custom to be of no significance and concluded that
the order of banishment was void and against public policy.3 7 An-
other court holding that a proceeding in habeas corpus was appro-
priate was the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 1967, in the case of
State v. Halverson.3 8 Halverson was sentenced for burglary and ban-
ished from the State of Minnesota. A writ of habeas corpus was filed
attacking the order of banishment. The Court held that it was be-
yond the power of a court to impose banishment as a condition of pro-
bation. The Court aligned itself with California rather than Ken-
32 397 S.W.2d 780 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
88 People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App.2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (1959) ; Ex parte Scarborough,
76 Cal. App.2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (1946).
34 California v. Lopen, 81 Cal, App. 199 (1927).
35 Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal. App.2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (1946) ; In re Newborn, 168
Cal. App.2d 472, 335 P.2d 948 (1959).
36 People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App.2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (1959). The Court held it
was beyond the power of the Court to impose banishment from the county as a con-
dition of protection.
37 In re Newborn, 168 Cal. App.2d 472, 335 P.2d 948 (1959).
38 278 Minn. 381, 154 N.W.2d 699 (1967).
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tucky in holding that the imposition of banishment was void and a
separate part of the judgment of conviction and that the probation
could not be revoked on the violation of the invalid condition of
probation.
. In 1970, a California court concluded in the case of In re Bushman39
that the condition of probation was invalid as (1) it had no relation
to the crime, (2) it related to conduct not itself criminal and (3) it
required or forbids conduct not related to future criminality.
A case of note arising in Virginia was Loving v. Virginia.40 Loving
was convicted of miscegenation in the State of Virginia and received
a suspended sentence on condition that he leave the state for 25 years.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States reversed on other
grounds,41 it is interesting to note that the Virginia Supreme Court,
while upholding the conviction for miscegenation, struck down the
banishment part of the sentence as void.
Conclusion
Although the States of California and Minnesota have considered
habeas corpus to be the appropriate means of testing the sentencing
court's jurisdiction to impose banishment, the State of Ohio has fol-
lowed a narrower construction in the -dsall case by holding that
appeal was the procedure to pursue. Appellate courts have consis-
tently and systematically struck down orders of banishment when
they have reviewed; the rationale for such decisions being predicated
on questions of public policy and lack of statutory authority. None
of the reviewing courts have been willing to consider the consti-
tutional issues involved but have decided the cases on the basis of
the weight of American decisional law. Thus banishment will con-
tinue to exist until such time that the appellate courts of each of
the 50 sovereign states have had the question presented to them.
Until that time, and so long as the consitutional issues are not deter-
mined, and so long as persons accept the expedience of banishment in
exchange for their freedom, our sentencing courts can continue to
banish with impunity those persons considered undesirable.
Throughout history, men have been ostracized by insecure gov-
ernments. The pages of history are replete with the banishment of
well known personages. What is perhaps more tragic, however, is
the banishment of large numbers of ordinary and nondescript citizens
from our cities and counties. The life of the exile is indeed harsh
and, in all probability, the practices of magistrate courts and other
sentencing courts in ordering the expulsion of "troublemakers" and
"drifters" will continue until such time that the constitutional issues
have been met head on.
:8 1 Ca.d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970).
40 206 Va. 924., 14-7 S.E.2d 79 (1966).
41 Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967).
May 1972
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss2/15
